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Operational Risk Management Matrix


wildweasel_pt
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No flight safety people hovering around here? This is a topic i'd like to discuss with somebody that is familiar with it. Does anyone tell me whats the latest date on AFPAM 90-902 (ORM tools and guidelines)? My version is from 2000. I believe that in the meantime an update must have been issued. Thanks

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14 DEC 2000 is the latest. There is an AFMC instruction you can also look through.

http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/?txtSearchWord=90-902&rdoFormPub=rdoPub

Thank you again for the help on this. By the way, i don't know if you're an active duty military but do you know if the squadrons have a matrix for calculating ORM? Back in the 38s we used to have some numeric factors (X winds, nite flt, IMC, low level and some more) that we would add up and depending on the total, the Go / No Go decision would be taken either by the SUP/SOF, flt cmdr, DO, SQN CMDR ad so on. DO you guys flying hercs have something similar 2 that?

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We do. However, I cannot, in good faith, reccomend its use. It is a CYA tool for commanders, not a true ORM tool for crews. You add up the numbers (which are meaningless) and you never change what you're doing because the numbers are rigged so you'd have to be saving the world to get to a "high" category requiring high level approval.

The problem isn't the concept, it's the implementation of it. You cannot impose a static, binary, objective process onto a dynamic & subjective situation.

For example, low ceilings may affect low level flight, but don't mean a hill of beans to me if I'm up at high-level in the cruise. It's not contextual. It changes.

AFSOC has moved away from numbers and gone to more subjective evaluations - better, but still not perfect.

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We do. However, I cannot, in good faith, reccomend its use. It is a CYA tool for commanders, not a true ORM tool for crews. You add up the numbers (which are meaningless) and you never change what you're doing because the numbers are rigged so you'd have to be saving the world to get to a "high" category requiring high level approval.

The problem isn't the concept, it's the implementation of it. You cannot impose a static, binary, objective process onto a dynamic & subjective situation.

For example, low ceilings may affect low level flight, but don't mean a hill of beans to me if I'm up at high-level in the cruise. It's not contextual. It changes.

AFSOC has moved away from numbers and gone to more subjective evaluations - better, but still not perfect.

I completely understand and agree with all you said. Thats why my idea is to make a risk assessment table where you can enter with the probability and severity of the risk in question. This means that for low probability and low severity you have a low number on risk factor and so on (as it is in accordance with AFPAM 90-902) Of course that we can only add up the factors that apply, if you're not flyin VFR low level whats the purpose of adding the low ceiling factor? But nevertheless and to justify that those factors are relative and have to be weighed in different ways you may see how much X winds affect a flight if it is a flight for experienced pilots or if it is for training a rookie pilot, of course the probability is the same of having those X winds throughout the mission but the severity changes as its much more as a risc factor for the rookie flying. Other factors do not depend on probability as well like landing on unprepared surfaces when you are operating where there are only those kind of strips. It depends, thats why this is a dynamic process and the squadron should use every mean on its reach to lower these risks (implementing control measures - step 5 of the ORM process) in order to lower the decision level and allow for "easier" accomplishment of the mission/task. Take a look at this table, its just a idea but of course that those factors can only be weighed with experience and flying time and like i said before this has to be a dynamic process (6 step cycle like its suposed to be). Thanks for the input. BTW sorry about the fact that is in Portuguese but i think you'll be able to figure it out (severity on the left and probability on top)

picture1uey.jpg

Edited by wildweasel_pt
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Oh, make no mistake, I understand what's going on here, but the reality is this is nothing more than "window dressing" no matter how you slice it.

What you're trying to do is quantify and objectify common sense.

I'm very familiar with the construct you've got pictured - I use it to argue my points when it serves my purposes. ;) The reality is, it's still just a numbers game.

We tend to want to avoid risk, so we work hard to identify it rather than training for it. For example, some things we do are inherently more dangerous than others and the absoluute best mitigation is simply to do it more frequently so as to maintain proficiency in it - not avoid it. Most "leaders" are unable to grasp this concept.

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The thing is that training is no more than a control measure to reduce risk. Risk is opportunity, and eventhough the hazzard is always there we can reduce the opportunity to allow it to harm the mission by using that 4th step that the thinkers developed in the 90-902. ORM is way broad to reduce it to this. The principle is right and one need to adapt it to whatever his occupation/function is. Can you send me a copy of your matrix? Im curious to see how you guys did it. Every user will have his own different way to apply it.

And allow me to correct something you said (thats my own opinion). WE can't never avoid risc. Its always there. We can try to eliminate hazzards. Thats how i see ORM as a tool to manage the risc inherent to the task, helping on deciding the course of action...

Edited by wildweasel_pt
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You're right - you cannot avoid risk completely, but we try...too much.

As I said, some things are more risky than others - for various reasons.

Something not often appreciated is what goes into risk - hazard & exposure. A great example is the very common statistic that 75% of auto accidents occur within 25 miles of the home. This isn't because the roads close to home are more dangerous, rather, we're on them more - exposure vs hazard. Otherwise, we'd just move... ;)

Some things we do pose a greater hazard than others - we can reduce exposure, but that's often a short-sighted way to mitigate the overall risk. For example, low-level flight is riskier than high-level flight - the hazard is you're closer to the ground with less time to deal with problems once they develop. You could mitigate the risk by reducing the exposure (ie - don't fly low-level) and there are some people who advocate that, but the reality is, you can also mitigate the risk by reducing the liklihood of problems occuring by having more effective maintenance, or you could mitigate the risk by training more and being more proficient in the low-level environment. But the truth remains, that if you never fly low-level, you'll never have a low-level accident...following this ridiculous line of thinking (sounds ridiculous to us, but not to "leaders"), if you reduce the low-level, you reduce the exposure and hence the risk. I argue, you're making it worse because you're reducing proficiency.

However, in today's military, it seems leaders are more politician than leader and their priority is to avoid problems on their watch.

My unit's ORM matrix won't be of much use as it's specific to our plane and mission...

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I completely undersign what you just said and believe me when i say that im way against the policy no risk=>don't do. Of course no one wants worries on their watch. The only thing thats available for SQNs to do is train more to make us more profficient in our line of work. Only by repetition one can make it easier, its like a juggler. The risk can be carachterized by probability, severity and of course as you said and the 90-902 says as well EXPOSURE. Of course that if you're showing urself to hazzard its gonna catch you sooner or later, exposure affects probability.

Its the same all over the world. Im gonna tell you something. One of these days i was talking to a PIC and told him that we needed to do some training on tactical/random approaches on unprepared surfaces (we deploy to KABUL every year or so and we have to operate on those conditions often). He told me that we should not do that because its risky...:confused:. Of course it is!!!!. And if we don't do it its gonna get riskier by the day (i have an idea for the cause of the negative response but im gonna keep it to myself). Instead everytime we go for training is to draw blacklines on the threshold and shoot ILSs, things that we do everysingle general transport flight. Are we operational or not? LAPES is already a chapter in history books...

Why don't we instead of reducing exposure we just improve the way we handle the hazardous situations by being more able to be performant in those very same situations??? (SQN level of seeing things against MAJCOM perspective...:))

Edited by wildweasel_pt
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