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US Herk

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Everything posted by US Herk

  1. Unfortunately, the USAF has used the Jackson Hole mishap to impose some fairly restrictive departure procedures. After the crash, they took approach plates to Dyess and asked all the pilots if they knew what the trouble-T was. Most did not and of those that did know, many of them still didn't know there was additional information in the front of the book regarding departure procedures. Advanced Instrument School uses this vignette to illustrate how haphazard the C-130 community was back in those days. But I eagerly pointed out that normal ops back then was to get out a chart for the terminal area and figure out how to get into/out of the local area. A study of the area surrounding Jackson Hole would've presented several options for departing safely - even if you couldn't meet the published climb gradients (which the mighty C-130 often has difficulty meeting). I knew the AC on that plane. There were a LOT of contributing factors, but the bottom line is they screwed up. Jackson Hole and the Ron Brown crash were "watershed" events for USAF instrument flying resulting in some fairly draconian knee-jerk reactions that plague us to this day.
  2. I'd be willing to bet it was the alter-ego of someone else...anonymous boards tend to elicit that type of posting.
  3. I did, but I couldn't reply to it. I am not in the unit. I'm not affiliated with the unit in any way, other than I was in it many years ago during its first incarnation as a Herk unit in the great composite wing experiment of the mid-90s.
  4. Then there's Radar Love...for the Talon guys!
  5. I signed in 5 July - a few days after the official stand-up. We had one plane (9810?) - I then picked up 5 of our planes from POB & LRF over the next several weeks...
  6. I'm away on leave, so don't have my dash-1 handy, but isn't that in Section 5?
  7. I was a Combat Marsupial in the 52AS at Moody - 94-96. Before I fled the bright patches for the subdued...
  8. My understanding is the plumbing is still there, just capped off - reason being - in the field, you may get the old style pump and require it....
  9. Probably the Hostile Environment Repair Procedures manual...
  10. My reference to Lockheed was for the J-model. They didn't take a big enough leap forward to eliminate crewmembers. Might be easier if they didn't start from the 737 airline software for a tactical mission... I know the end AMP was quite good from everyone I know who was personally involved (which wasn't many). Even the TF system came around and by most accounts was good. But it took a lot longer to deliver and cost way more than promised. Worth it? I don't know - not my decision. I won't be around long enough to see it in all likelihood.
  11. They could certify SCNS (and the AFSOC) nav systems to fly in Europe if they wanted to. AFFSA doesn't want to. The capability is there - we do it every day. The radios? That's easy - 8.33KHz spacing is nothing new. SCNS software update and a new radio (depending on the radio you have currently, may just need the software). None of the RVSM stuff really and truly applies to Herks - we don't fly that high. RNP is the big thing - the tolerances aren't that tough right now - easily attainable with your standard Litton/Honeywell RLG - the question is certification... Believe me, I get it. DT&E is SUPPOSED to find problems - that's what it's there for. Even OT&E EXPECTS to find problems. Truthfully, I've never believed in adapting an airways software package to do tactical airlift. Too much trick-f**King the system. When you eliminate crewmembers, you've got to take a quantum leap forward in technology - neither the J, nor AMP really did that. I've seen cockpits (in simulator testing I did 10 years ago) that would've run rings around either from a tactical perspective. If you want to talk about short-sightedness, talk about it to the engineers at Boeing and Lockheed as well as USAF.
  12. I think that's because Skip cut/pasted from Facebook...
  13. It is a memorial to Wrath 11, the MC-130H that was lost in Albania in '05. It stands outside the 7th SOS at RAF Mildenhall.
  14. Skip - that was posted in honor of MSgt Lynn Howard who passed away after a very brief battled with brain cancer. She was set to retire this fall. She will be missed. I swiped it from Bob Woods over on the old board...
  15. US Herk

    C-130 h3

    Have heard these may show up in AFSOC on Gunships...
  16. In flight, it should never be below 98% - even accounting for 2% inaccuracy, that only gets you to 96% - no factor for accel bleed valves. I don't care about any of that - the only one that matters is inflight - 98-102. The rest of the time, I'm on the ground and can get it looked at if there's a question! :D To distill down many words, at high altitude cruise, your blade angle is high. As you descend into thicker air, the blade angle will decrease to maintain RPM. If you set flight idle at altitude and began your descent, you will eventually get NTS as you descend. There is an institutional fear of NTS sending a prop to feather based on older NTS plungers that would do this, and there have been a very small handful since the teflon coating. Consequently, we tend to try to avoid NTS and that's probably where your SQ SOP comes from...
  17. Until the late '90s, it wasn't uncommon for RAF SF guys to jump with the SAS guys...then someone found out and the defacation hit the rotary air oscillator....big time. Firings, courts martial, etc. Don't know that it happens anymore... Supposedly, it got so crazy at times, that at one time, a CP landed the plane... ...solo
  18. You probably can't get to this website, but you might find a contact on it somewhere: https://rmis.kirtland.af.mil I think their contact email is rmis@kirtland.af.mil This is the ORM university website...
  19. You're right - you cannot avoid risk completely, but we try...too much. As I said, some things are more risky than others - for various reasons. Something not often appreciated is what goes into risk - hazard & exposure. A great example is the very common statistic that 75% of auto accidents occur within 25 miles of the home. This isn't because the roads close to home are more dangerous, rather, we're on them more - exposure vs hazard. Otherwise, we'd just move... Some things we do pose a greater hazard than others - we can reduce exposure, but that's often a short-sighted way to mitigate the overall risk. For example, low-level flight is riskier than high-level flight - the hazard is you're closer to the ground with less time to deal with problems once they develop. You could mitigate the risk by reducing the exposure (ie - don't fly low-level) and there are some people who advocate that, but the reality is, you can also mitigate the risk by reducing the liklihood of problems occuring by having more effective maintenance, or you could mitigate the risk by training more and being more proficient in the low-level environment. But the truth remains, that if you never fly low-level, you'll never have a low-level accident...following this ridiculous line of thinking (sounds ridiculous to us, but not to "leaders"), if you reduce the low-level, you reduce the exposure and hence the risk. I argue, you're making it worse because you're reducing proficiency. However, in today's military, it seems leaders are more politician than leader and their priority is to avoid problems on their watch. My unit's ORM matrix won't be of much use as it's specific to our plane and mission...
  20. Oh, make no mistake, I understand what's going on here, but the reality is this is nothing more than "window dressing" no matter how you slice it. What you're trying to do is quantify and objectify common sense. I'm very familiar with the construct you've got pictured - I use it to argue my points when it serves my purposes. The reality is, it's still just a numbers game. We tend to want to avoid risk, so we work hard to identify it rather than training for it. For example, some things we do are inherently more dangerous than others and the absoluute best mitigation is simply to do it more frequently so as to maintain proficiency in it - not avoid it. Most "leaders" are unable to grasp this concept.
  21. We do. However, I cannot, in good faith, reccomend its use. It is a CYA tool for commanders, not a true ORM tool for crews. You add up the numbers (which are meaningless) and you never change what you're doing because the numbers are rigged so you'd have to be saving the world to get to a "high" category requiring high level approval. The problem isn't the concept, it's the implementation of it. You cannot impose a static, binary, objective process onto a dynamic & subjective situation. For example, low ceilings may affect low level flight, but don't mean a hill of beans to me if I'm up at high-level in the cruise. It's not contextual. It changes. AFSOC has moved away from numbers and gone to more subjective evaluations - better, but still not perfect.
  22. The Cherry A-model has been at Kirtland in the past...
  23. Should be able to get it from the Maxwell website - Air University Press...on horribly slow dial-up, or would go find it for you...
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