Please don't make the mistake that I don't think the Air Force has a huge portion of blame here, but this isn't about who shares more blame. This is about getting the best system to the warfighter the quickest and cheapest way possible. Military acquisitions long ago became a tool of the military industrial complex only muddied by idealists in uniform... I've always said that the acquisition cycle is best described as: the military requests a galaxy, industry promises a solar system for IOC, and the military ends up accepting a planet with the promise of an extra moon in spiral development. All over cost and late. Yes, the military shoots themselves in the foot with changeover of personnel in key acquisitions programs. Yes, the military fails to put the right people in the right places (and not just in acquisitions). Yes, both sides view the others as necessary evils. But I'm in industry now - I've seen the sausage being made - I know how "corrupt" the industry can be. I witnessed industry BD guy tell industry supplier, "We now need to write the RFP for the customer, tell them what they want, and make it so it's sole source". Makes good business sense to me, but as an operator, it makes my skin crawl...so don't pretend that all the onus is on changing military desires; it's a combination of poor compromises made by industry in the first place - whomever agreed to AMP version 1.0 was an idiot. All of the change that was requested, not just by AFSOC, was to fix a poor agreed-upon design...I'm not saying the military didn't agree to it, simply that it didn't fit the bill. Slick salesmanship, corrupt AF officials, standard marketing/BD hype - whatever - it doesn't matter. AMP did start working in the end - great. How late? How over budget? Forget whose fault, set that aside because there's blame on both sides - where that blame starts/ends is largely irrelevant, but it colors our perspective. From your perspective, the change was what caused the problem and that falls squarely on AF acquisitions shoulders. From my perspective, the blame lies in the original contract, so the change the AF acquisitions guys pushed was a necessity caused by poor initial contracting. Regardless of who is right (we both are), the end result is we still don't have a system on the plane and the operators are the ones suffering - Boeing still got paid. The bottom line is, now AMP technology is another decade or two old. Do we really want to bolt on obsolete technology that will have to be updated again soon, or should we just start over. I vote start over...warts and all. Your example of the J-model not being able to fly a GPS approach actually proves my point - the certification standard the J-model was built to is now 30 years old and now requires updating. The HUD will be deemed obsolete and non-supported beginning in 2020 - even for planes rolling off the line in 2019. Technology, once cemented into a contract, is immediately dated and has a limited shelf life - so too is the AMP technology and we're over a decade into it...and it was old when we started. Let's move on. Believe me, I know how passionate things get when you're personally involved in a project - I had many that never came to fruition, but would answer several capabilities gaps - sometimes though, the best answer is to move on.